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Abstract
Today, the amount of raw data available is abundant. As only a small part of this data is
in a form fit for further processing, there is many data left to analyze and process. At
the same time, cloud services are ubiquitous and allow even small businesses to perform
large tasks of distributed data processing without the significant costs required for a
suitable computational infrastructure. However, as more and more users transfer their
data into the cloud for processing and storage, concerns about data security arise. An
extensive review of data security research in today’s cloud solutions confirms these con-
cerns to be justified. The existing strategies for securing one’s data are not adequate for
many use cases. Therefore, this work proposes a holistic security concept for distributed
data processing in the cloud. For the purpose of providing security in heterogeneous
cloud environments, it statically analyzes a data flow prior to execution and determines
the optimal security measurements. Without imposing strict requirements on the cloud
services involved, it can be deployed in a broad range of scenarios. The concept’s generic
design can be adopted by existing data processing tools. An exemplary implementation
is provided for the mashup tool FlexMash. Requirements, such as data confidentiality,
integrity, access control, and scalability were evaluated to be met.
Kurzfassung
Die heutige Menge an vorhandenen Daten ist enorm. Viele davon müssen zunächst
verarbeitet und analysiert werden, da nur ein geringer Teil dieser Daten für die weitere
Verarbeitung geeignet ist. Cloud-basierte Dienste sind allgegenwärtig und erlauben es
auch kleineren Unternehmen Datenverarbeitung durchzuführen, ohne die Kosten von
notwendiger Infrastruktur tragen zu müssen. Mit einer zunehmenden Zahl an Nutzern
von Clouds wachsen jedoch auch Bedenken der Sicherheit. Eine ausführliche Durchsicht
der aktuellen Forschung zu diesem Thema bestätigt diese Bedenken und existierende
Strategien zur Sicherung der eigenen Daten berücksichtigen viele Fälle nicht. Daher stellt
diese Arbeit ein ganzheitliches Sicherheitskonzept für die verteilte Datenverarbeitung
in der Cloud vor. Damit Sicherheit in heterogenen Cloudumgebungen gewährleistet
werden kann, wird ein Datenfluss vor der Ausführung statisch analysiert und es werden
die für diesen Fluss optimalen Sicherheitsmaßnahmen festgelegt. Das Konzept besitzt
einen breiten Anwendungsbereich, da keine straffen Anforderungen an die genutzten
Dienste gestellt werden. Das generische Design des Konzepts ermöglicht eine einfache
Integration in bereits existierende Datenverarbeitungsanwendungen, wie beispielhaft
an FlexMash gezeigt wird. Anforderungen, wie die Vertraulichkeit von Daten, deren
Integrität, Zugriffskontrolle und Skalierbarkeit des Systems konnten erreicht werden.
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1 Introduction
The days of constrained data storage are long over and, as nowadays acquiring data is no
problem anymore either, the amount of data stored is constantly increasing [KAF+08].
However, Gantz and Reinsel [GR12] assume that less than 3% of data is analyzed and
tagged. The remainder of this data is raw data, that is, it needs to be processed before it
can be put to use. Out of this raw data, they estimated 23% to be useful to enterprises
and other users. Consequently, there is a lot of data left to process.
Accessing this immense amount of raw data requires efficient analysis. Automatic
processing, without human interaction, comes to mind and can be a suitable approach
to make this data useful. However, as Puolamäki et al. [PBT+10] mention, humans have
to be part of data analysis, in order for the analysis to cope with the complexity involved
in processing domain-specific and heterogeneous data sets. Because data analysis and
processing requires both technical experts and experts with domain-specific knowledge
for a given set of data, this generates new problems, such as a high communication
overhead and inflexible implementations. Solutions, such as FlexMash [HM16], are
available to solve this and allow domain-specific users to create data mashups in order
to realize data processing without technical knowledge.
Even though huge amounts of data are available and means to process them exist, the
high costs for necessary computing infrastructures excluded many users in the past.
However, nowadays cloud services for data processing and storage are ubiquitous, many
offerings exist and considerably increase the audience of distributed data processing. As
more and more users entrust their data to the cloud, the concern for security rises.
To address these concerns, a security concept for distributed data processing in the cloud
is proposed. Its requirements are based on an extensive literature research to not only
assess the security issues found in current cloud solutions but also to evaluate existing
strategies to secure a user’s data. The proposed solution of this work is a holistic security
concept that allows a customer of cloud solutions to perform secure distributed data
processing in an inhomogeneous environment of cloud services. Its design is generic
and can be adapted to many existing data processing tools, as it is demonstrated with
FlexMash.
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Outline
This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 – Related Work and Fundamentals introduces the data mashup tool
FlexMash and explains two selected cryptosystems.
Chapter 3 – Cloud Security: State of the Art provides an overview of security issues
one has to expect as customer of cloud solutions, along with solutions to these
issues found in current research.
Chapter 4 – Security Concept presents the proposed solution of this thesis to secure
distributed data processing in the cloud.
Chapter 5 – Implementation in FlexMash suggests a way to implement the security
concept in an existing data processing tool.
Chapter 6 – Evaluation validates whether the requirements of the security concept
could be met.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion and Future Work finishes this thesis by summarizing the re-
sults and giving pointers for future work.
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2 Related Work and Fundamentals
This chapter introduces FlexMash, which is used to demonstrate the proposed security
concept, followed by the fundamentals of two different kinds of cryptosystems.
2.1 FlexMash
FlexMash is a data mashup tool that allows domain experts, without technical under-
standing of databases, clouds and services, to create complex data processing scenarios.
It was first presented by Hirmer and Mitschang [HM16] and further extended by Hirmer
and Behringer [HB17].
FlexMash consists of six steps. During the first step, a user models a mashup plan. It
consists of so called Data Source Description (DSD) and Data Processing Description
(DPD) nodes that a user can connect arbitrarily in order to create the desired data
mashup. A user can create such a mashup using a graphical modeling tool without
expertise in data processing. The modeler does not need any knowledge of how these
Domain Expert
models
Mashup Plan
Data Source
Descriptions
accesses
DSD 
Repo.
End
Node
Data Processing 
Descriptions
IT Expert
DPD 
Repo.
creates
Start
Node
Data Source Description (DSD)
Data Processing Description (DPD)
Figure 2.1: FlexMash overview with a domain expert modeling a mashup plan. Illustra-
tion by Hirmer and Mitschang [HM16].
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nodes are implemented because implementations are provided by technical experts and
stored in repositories, as can be seen in Figure 2.1 [HM16]. The result is an abstract
description of a mashup — a plan that cannot be executed yet.
In the cours of the next step, the modeler can select a set of non-functional requirements
from a catalog. These requirements can influence data processing in different ways,
such as prioritizing robustness or execution speed.
During the third step, a runtime environment has to be selected, which is mainly
influenced by the previous selection of requirements. Communication layers, interfaces
between software components, and the execution engine, are part of the runtime
environment and need to be chosen so that the selected requirements can be fulfilled.
The fourth step transforms the abstract and general plan into an executable form that
can be directly used by an appropriate engine. Possible targets for an executable plan
include the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) standard and the Web Services
Business Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL), both representations for business
processes. These languages enjoy widespread software support and allow the usage of
readily available workflow technology for execution.
The chosen engine executes the transformed plan during the fifth step by provisioning
appropriate services on-demand for each DSD and DPD node. Their respective imple-
mentation extracts data from defined sources and processes it according to the modeled
plan.
The final step completes the data processing by either visualizing results or using them
as input for further processing. These steps can also be seen in Figure 5.1 [HB17].
2.2 Cryptosystems
Cryptography is an important technology in the field of information security, with
application to secure cloud data processing, as explained by Winkler [Win11]. It can be
used to prevent adversaries from reading confidential messages and, to an extent, impede
modifications. Cryptosystems can be divided into two major categories: symmetric and
asymmetric ones. In a symmetric cryptosystem, it is computationally easy to derive a
decryption key from the corresponding encryption key (and vice versa). In many cases
they are even identical. However, in an asymmetric scheme, it is computationally not
feasible to derive a private key based on a public key.
Further variations exist in these categories of cryptosystems. Following, two asymmetric
cryptosystems with useful features are explained in greater detail.
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2.2.1 Proxy Re-Encryption
The concept of proxy re-encryption was introduced by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss
[BBS98]. It describes a public-key cryptosystem that allows a third party (proxy) to alter
a chipertext that has been encrypted for a user’s key pair, so that another user’s key pair
can decrypt it. The goal is to achieve this without having plaintext accessible at any time
of the re-encryption and without revealing the secret key of involved users — security is
not to be compromised.
In an asymmetric encryption scheme used by the users A and B, each user has a secret
key SK and a public key PK. The functions E() and D() perform encryption and
decryption respectively, so that m = DSKA(EPKA(m)) holds true. Proxy re-encryption
adds a re-encryption key RKA→B and a re-encryption function π() that allows us to
transform the encryption of a given ciphertext from one user (delegator) to another
(delegatee). These additions allow:
m = DSKB(πRKA→B(EPKA(m)))
The re-encryption can be delegated to a third party because the function π() requires
no cryptographic key from A or B, only the specifically generated re-encryption key
RKA→B.
For ideal security, a theoretical proxy re-encryption scheme should prevent a proxy
from reading any plaintext. Neither delegator, delegatee nor proxy should be able to
see secret keys of each other. The generation of a re-encryption key should require an
active delegate and the key should work unidirectional, that is, a generated key RKA→B
cannot be used in reverse RKA←B. Moreover, B should be unable to further delegate
A’s re-encrypted messages.
Chung, Liu, and Hwang [CLH14] list various properties that can be used to classify proxy
re-encryption schemes, for example, the level of trust placed into the proxy. In addition,
the already mentioned bi- or unidirectionality of a delegation and whether generating
the re-encryption key requires an active delegate. The delegation can be transitive and
can allow re-delegation by the delegatee. Furthermore, it can be temporary, so that
re-encryption is only possible until a certain event occurs.
The proxy can decide for whom it performs re-encryption of certain data. Additionally,
A can decide if a re-encryption key RKA→B can be generated and the proxy can decide
whether B can access it.
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2.2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
In a homomorphic encryption scheme calculations can be performed directly on cipher-
text with the decrypted result equaling a calculation performed on the plaintext. With
Ek() being an encryption function using key k, we have:
Ek(f1(m1,m2)) = f2(Ek(m1), Ek(m2))
Note that neither of the functions f1, f2 require any additional input such as crypto-
graphic keys. This property is especially interesting whenever a third party wants to
work on encrypted data without the need for decryption, key transfers, and possible
violation of security.
The general term of homomorphic cryptosystems can be subdivided into fully and par-
tially homomorphic cryptosystems. A fully homomorphic cryptosystem allows to perform
arbitrary computations on ciphertext any number of times, while partially homomorphic
systems can only perform certain operations, such as addition or multiplication. Fully
homomorphic systems come with a huge computational cost and real time usage in
larger scales is questionable at this point [NLV11]. Effort is made to change this and
more efficient schemes do exist [BGV12] as well as usable implementations [Hal17].
Many more widely known cryptosystems have partially homomorphic properties, for ex-
ample, RSA and ElGamal [El 85] 1, both homomorphic with respect to multiplication.
1An asymmetric cryptosystem. Used, among others, by GNU Privacy Guard
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As cloud offerings are applied to more and more scenarios, the concern for security
increased equally among already acquired as well as potential customers. Naturally,
security related challenges are object of ongoing research. Following, security concerns
of cloud offerings are presented and existing solutions are evaluated.
3.1 Security Concerns
From low level virtualization to high level protocols, the cloud utilizes a broad range
of technologies to provide attractive services. While customers benefit from the advan-
tages, they are also exposed to the combined amount of security issues of the involved
technologies [GWS11]. The increased amount of network traffic, compared to local
servers, adds further attack vectors a customer of cloud offerings is exposed to.
Before general security concerns can be discussed, a distinction has to be made between
the concept of threats and vulnerabilities, based on a definition by Hashizume et al.
[HRFF13]. While threats represent a specific attack — a malicious action taken against
a victim — a vulnerability is the means through which such an attack can be carried out.
A threat exploits a vulnerability. Each vulnerability comes along with potential threats
and a single threat can be realized through different vulnerabilities or a combination
thereof. Even though it is possible to detect the occurrence of a threat by means of audit
and monitoring, a threat itself cannot be fixed. Instead, the corresponding vulnerability
has to be eliminated. As an example, one might consider a personal computer without
password protection. Everyone with physical access can extract personal data from
such a computer and this action represents a threat. In order to prevent such a threat,
the underlying vulnerability — lack of password protection — has to be eliminated.
However, even though implementing a password will eliminate this vulnerability, there
might still be others present that allow an attacker to extract private data. As such,
threats are useful to identify vulnerabilities and help to asses the security of a system.
However, removing one vulnerability does not necessarily eliminate a threat.
In the following, general security concerns in distributed data processing are presented
in form of real and existing threats, along with the vulnerabilities they lead to. Concerns
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are categorized in order to provide a better overview. Instead of a classification strictly
enumerating technical components, categories are based on the coverage of existing
research to allow for a problem-centric approach.
Data Security
Threats concerning data are potentially most important to users and are present in every
area of data processing. They endanger confidentiality and integrity of a cloud offering
customer’s data and affect data in all situations: when being transmitted (in-transit),
saved on non-volatile storage (at-rest) and even while being processed (in-use).
Essentially, all unencrypted data has to be considered vulnerable to threats targeting
confidentiality. Data without digital signatures or inadequate communication security
is susceptible to forged authenticity and loss of integrity. Such can be accomplished
with Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks [Wil14], allowing an adversary to eavesdrop
or even manipulate data in-transit.
Due to the managed nature of cloud solutions, various tasks, such as backups, are often
transparently done by the cloud provider, sometimes even delegated to contracted third
parties. As Jansen [Jan11] explains, this can introduce further vulnerabilities a user
might not even be aware of. This also turns secure deletion of data into a difficult
problem because a user does not necessarily know whether more copies of his or her
data exist, nor where they are.
Access Management
When handling data, it is important to know who is allowed to access and alter which
parts of a data set. In order to enforce access policies, it is necessary to properly identify
and authenticate users as well as computer systems. The absence of access management,
identification and authorization as well as key management systems, are vulnerabilities
itself. However, not only do such systems have to exist in the first place, they also have to
be secure and need to be used correctly to prevent introduction of new, system-specific
vulnerabilities.
Especially with cloud offerings that usually provide at least one privileged account
to customers, Hashizume et al. [HRFF13] point out account or service hijacking as a
serious concern because it gives an attacker complete control. Grobauer, Walloschek, and
Stocker [GWS11] bring up the similarly threatening session riding: typically exploiting
weaknesses in a cloud provider’s management of user sessions, granting an attacker
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privileges equal to the victim’s account. Furthermore, impersonation of privileged users
is a threat in the absence of identification and authentication mechanisms.
A key management system is often a crucial part of access management. In order to
implement such systems, multiple questions have to be answered, such as: way of key
exchange, location of a key store and mapping of access privileges to it. This is no easy
task, since an architectural flaw can expose vulnerabilities that render such a system
ineffective or even useless. This is a problem, especially in cloud environments, where
few approaches or open standards exist for key management systems, as Chandramouli
and Mell [CM10] indicate.
Typical for cloud offerings is that certain tasks are managed by the provider. This is
one of the reasons for using clouds after all. However, this also forgoes control of
one’s own data to a certain extent and renders specific forms of access management
ineffective. This might be the case when enforcement of access policies is not based
on encryption and a cloud provider contracts a third party to back up data, as noted
by Bisong, Syed, and Rahman [BSR11]. On such a backup, access privileges are not
enforced and unexpected or unauthorized restoration might expose it to the public.
Architecture
Including cloud offerings into own applications has many implications and consequences
due to the architecture of such services. They represent externally owned and remotely
managed instances, where a user’s influence greatly varies depending on the specific
service and offering.
For one, there is the general field of web technology security. Dawoud, Takouna, and
Meinel [DTM10] point out that since clouds are exposed to the web and communi-
cate using common web protocols and APIs, they naturally inherit all vulnerabilities
and threats found in these technologies. Together with Almorsy, Grundy, and Müller
[AGM16], they highlight widely used and adopted technologies, such as Simple Object
Access Protocol (SOAP), Remote Procedure Call (RPC) protocols, File Transfer Protocol
(FTP), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and their implementations to be a common
source of vulnerabilities. Methods used in penetration testing or cyber-related crimi-
nal activities, such as port scanning, can be used by an adversary to further identify
vulnerabilities in web services. Threats can target a service or customer directly, inter-
cept communication or forge sessions, ultimately leading to leakage of data. Common
threats include Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, where a service is rendered unusable
due to overloading its resources, or MITM attacks, where a data transfer between two
parties is intercepted and potentially even altered, as explained by Williams [Wil14].
Attacks, such as Domain Name System (DNS) cache poisoning, can be carried out when
21
3 Cloud Security: State of the Art
a cloud provider does not implement necessary protection or is using misconfigured
infrastructure. Various attacks target vulnerabilities in Extensible Markup Language
(XML) parsers and validation of transferred data and data structures in general.
Attacks, trying to exploit a cloud provider’s data validation implementations by inject-
ing manipulated input as well as exploiting billing, are potential threats from other
customers, as Grobauer, Walloschek, and Stocker [GWS11] describe. Therefore, it is
only natural that cloud providers seek to protect themselves and only expose a small
set of necessary controls to their customers. However, this course of action also strips
customers of ways to ensure security of their used services and data through monitoring.
With only little mechanisms for auditing available, it is not possible to set up proper
means to detect security breaches or intrusion attacks. This makes risk assessment
complicated or even impossible, as explained by Jansen [Jan11], who further mentions
the absence of standardized security metrics for clouds. Even if customers can perform
audits, the cloud provider has to respond to findings and patch identified issues. As a
consequence, a client has to rely on their cloud provider’s proficiency in secure infras-
tructures. The provider is responsible for taking necessary auditory measures, notifying
their customers in the event of security intrusions or other disruptions, mitigating attacks
and timely fixing corresponding problems. Grobauer, Walloschek, and Stocker [GWS11]
and [HRFF13] illustrate scenarios where a cloud provider fails the security expectations
of its customers by employing deprecated cryptographic ciphers, leading to exploitable
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, a cloud provider might not even take security measures
for internal data transfers or storage, making customers vulnerable to attacks from
adversaries, such as other customers.
Other than unknowingly risking their customers’ security, certain security-impairing
decisions are taken deliberately. As described by Jansen [Jan11], providers not only
share hardware among customers in Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offerings, multi-
tenancy is often used in Software as a Service (SaaS) offerings. While this allows a
provider to effectively use available resources and operate more economically, it also
means that multiple customers get served by a single instance of a software that handles
each customer’s data together. Multiple customers’ data can arbitrarily be co-located, as
pointed out by Grobauer, Walloschek, and Stocker [GWS11]. Data isolation is difficult
or not even possible in such setups and a customer is often not aware of this happening.
A user has typically no control over the internal configuration and architecture of
a provider’s service offerings and can, therefore, not influence how his data will be
handled. This lack of control creates further problems. Even when customers implement
security measures within their own software on Platform as a Service (PaaS) or IaaS
solutions, a provider can perform operations they do not anticipate. For example, a
provider can persist data at any time as part of their internal management, and with that
copy a customer’s data before it was encrypted. Likewise, customers can never be sure if
their data is really deleted as they have only little control and often no knowledge of
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their provider’s internal processes, such as backups or other parts of redundancy and
availability guarantees.
In summary, not only do we rely on a provider’s competence, trust is required as well.
In the worst case, a provider is an adversary or forced to act like one. The possibilities
are endless: stored data, even provided libraries and runtime environments can be
manipulated, therefore, even own code cannot be trusted. Threats beyond a customer’s
data are possible when a provider possesses further sensitive details about a customer,
such as billing information.
The nature of clouds offering ubiquitous, distributed services can also cause non-
technical concerns because data is subject to the jurisdiction of the country the servers
are placed in, as Bisong, Syed, and Rahman [BSR11] point out. A country can impose
restrictions on the strength of encryption algorithms and might be legally entitled to
access a customer’s data.
Virtualization
One of the reasons so many attractive cloud offers exist today are advanced virtualiza-
tion techniques. They made it possible to easily manage and control large clusters of
hardware, even heterogeneous environments. Spinning up new Virtual Machines (VMs)
or tearing down running instances is done within seconds with a single click in a control-
ling instance called Virtual Machine Monitor/Hypervisor (VMM). User management is
equally straightforward and some of this control can even be exposed to users, allowing
them a certain amount of self-management, while isolation of VMs is maintained by the
VMM. The ability to only scale up when necessary and otherwise use minimal resources
while only paying what is really used, is a great advantage for customers that otherwise
have to support and maintain large amounts of server-power themselves.
Having said that, virtualization also introduces a whole new layer of potential vulnera-
bilities. Both VMM and VM can contain vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to break
isolation and manipulate internal processes as well as other VMs, as stated by Mather,
Kumaraswamy, and Latif [MKL09].
Fundamental features that make virtualization easy to manage are also targets of threats.
Dawoud, Takouna, and Meinel [DTM10] and Garfinkel and Rosenblum [GR05] show
how the migration of a VM — moving it from one physical host to another — can be
attacked by either intercepting migration data during transfer or by redirecting the
transferred VM image to a malicious destination. Not only can this lead to an adversary
gaining illegitimate access to data, such a migration can also move malicious VM images
behind firewalls and other security measures, into trusted security perimeters, where
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they can do their harm. As a VM image is simply a file at its base, modifications and
infections with malware are as easy as changing the image file. Equally, a simple copy
operation can be considered theft. This implies that a VM image is vulnerable to threats
even when offline and needs additional protection.
Hashizume et al. [HRFF13] describe further threats to data confidentiality. Snapshots of
customer VMs might be made by a cloud provider as part of their availability guarantees.
They usually contain the full state of a VM, including their data. Not only is this process
often transparent to the customers, the location and protection of these snapshots is as
well.
Snapshots are used for rollback of a VM, or more generally restoring a consistent state,
potentially even into the future, and Garfinkel and Rosenblum [GR05] see multiple
problems here. The security of a VM changes over time as vulnerabilities are introduced
and fixed, malware and viruses are caught and removed. If an adversary can trigger
a rollback, either through a vulnerability in a cloud provider’s internal management
mechanisms or with help from the provider, a less secure state can be restored. Known
vulnerabilities of this state can then be used to threaten data confidentiality and integrity.
A rollback to an earlier state can also influence or outright compromise cryptographic
protocols. These often rely on cryptographically secure pseudo-random number genera-
tors. Using snapshots and rollbacks, one can revert the VM to a point where a random
number was already determined but not yet used. This weakens several protocols, for ex-
ample, zero-knowledge based protocols, which leak private data when the same random
number is used multiple times. In the worst case, sensitive data, such as cryptographic
keys, are persisted during logging or in a snapshot and can be accessed by others.
Grobauer, Walloschek, and Stocker [GWS11] further identify public repositories for
machine images as vulnerability. Many cloud providers of IaaS or PaaS offerings provide
such repositories, often as marketplaces where third party companies can offer sup-
plementary services. Such images can already contain malicious code or be otherwise
prepared in order to allow adversaries to access or leak data. Moreover, once an image is
released and in use, it is difficult to provide software patches for detected vulnerabilities.
Garfinkel and Rosenblum [GR05] add that patch management for VMs is a complex
problem as their state is not linear. Instead, it is more akin to a tree where multiple
instances with different patch-level and inhomogeneous software versions can exist at
the same time. In the end, detected problems can remain unfixed for long and potentially
even resurface at a later date, when a VM was rolled back. Since VMs cycle between
online and offline states, infections can survive defensive and cleaning measurements
and remain dormant until an infected VM is activated again in the future. Because VMs
also scale up and down rapidly as instances are stopped, paused or new ones are created
all the time, vulnerabilities and other security issues get additionally amplified. This
highly dynamic nature of VMs also makes it hard to uniquely identify them. Commonly
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used values, such as a Media Access Control (MAC) address, can be changed on demand
as needed.
An adversary can also try to actively deprive us of available resources to disrupt oper-
ations, as described by Dawoud, Takouna, and Meinel [DTM10] and Hashizume et al.
[HRFF13]. Ristenpart et al. [RTSS09] adds that this can also be used to create so called
covert channels. These are means to gain information about a target in ways that were
not intended as communication channels, for example, by observing the system load of
certain processes or VM instances. Furthermore, processor components, such as cache,
pipelines, floating-point multiplier and branch predictors, as well as the memory bus,
were mentioned as potential covert channels. Zhang et al. [ZJRR12] specifically describe
how a malicious VM can extract cryptographic encryption keys from another VM. This is
accomplished with a cache-based covert channel: by repeatedly filling the processor’s
cache and measuring the cache load times, one can make predictions regarding the
computations done in between. Such timing information can be used to infer knowledge
about a victim’s cryptographic key, when the used encryption system’s operations have
execution times dependent on the key’s value. Such an attack, as well as many kinds of
covert channels, require an attacker to be located on the same physical hardware. How
this can be accomplished is shown in detail by Ristenpart et al. [RTSS09], demonstrating
their approach on Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). They successfully map the
internal infrastructure of Amazon’s IaaS offering and use this information to instantiate
a VM on the same physical hardware as their victim, enabling them to carry out attacks.
Monitoring a shared network enables attacks, such as a keystroke timing attack. It allows
to significantly speed up searching for a password by measuring the timing between
a victim’s individual keystrokes while entering a password. This is possible because
cloud providers often employ insecure virtual networks to share their network hardware
between customers, as mentioned by Wu et al. [WDWY10].
Distributed Processing
While cloud offerings allow for parallel processing in shared-memory fashion, they also
make it particularly easy to distribute processing across multiple compute nodes. Clouds,
with their ability to dynamically adjust to their customer’s needs as they release or
request more instances, are a suitable fit for such scenarios. As a cloud does not incur
constant cost like a traditional, self-owned data center does, there are ambitions to
transitions towards the usage of multiple clouds at the same time, further promoting
distributed processing of data.
AlZain et al. [APST12] present several benefits that utilizing multiple clouds in con-
junction can have. Even though cloud providers go to great lengths to achieve high
25
3 Cloud Security: State of the Art
availability rates, constant availability is not realistic. For customers, using multiple
clouds can further increase availability and redundancy. Additionally, customers can
easier protect themselves from adversaries among employees of a single cloud provider.
In the event of a cloud provider going out of business, a multi-cloud environment can
cope with only minimal interruptions.
However, multiple clouds also raise concerns. Previously, customers sent data to their
cloud and received results, with additional data transports within the provider’s infras-
tructure. With multi-cloud environments, data transfers between two providers are
also possible. Customers have little control over it and only few ways to assess the
security measures taken to ensure confidentiality and integrity [Jan11]. Cloud providers
and offerings differ vastly in their feature set. While the basic set of functionality is
usually aligned, protocols for access, user management and hardware capabilities are
inhomogeneous. For this reason, systems and frameworks that abstract multiple clouds
are used. Fortunately, problems, such as Byzantine faults, are within the scope of such
systems and do not need to be considered here. Still, existing systems and distributed
processing frameworks, such as Apache Hadoop, contain vulnerabilities. In case of
Apache Hadoop, authentication using Kerberos was added [DORZ11] with limited
support for fine-grained permissions and authorization, based on unencrypted data.
Integrity or privacy for network communications is not provided and query processing is
only supported for unencrypted data.
3.2 Solutions
As preventing all threats and eliminating all vulnerabilities is an immense task, multiple
measures have to be taken together. Most research focuses on one particular aspect
of cloud computing, sometimes assuming preconditions that are often not feasible
in reality. Zissis and Lekkas [ZL12] identify key technologies and components, such
as cryptography, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), authentication and authorization
techniques, that, chained together, protect confidentiality and integrity of a customer’s
data. However, the security of a system not only depends on the technologies being used
but also how they are applied. Vulnerabilities can be created by flaws in programming
and conceptual weaknesses in the security architecture alike. It is also important to
consider the use case, as it is not trivial to port security solutions from one scenario to
another. Different requirements often call for different approaches. Only few holistic
solutions exist and these have to be carefully evaluated regarding their assumptions,
use cases and security guarantees. Finally, among all security concerns, many problems
cannot be tackled by a customer of cloud offerings alone but require collaboration with
a provider.
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In the following, research tackling the mentioned security concerns is discussed and
evaluated regarding their approaches and potential shortcomings.
Data Security
In order to achieve secure storage, Kamara and Lauter [KL10] propose a system built
on top of a semi-trusted service provider. Within this additional layer, data is encrypted
with a symmetric scheme. The respective symmetric keys are encrypted using Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE), a public-key encryption scheme where a
set of attributes is attached to every user’s key and an access policy is associated with
each ciphertext [BSW07]. Using CP-ABE, users can only successfully decrypt a given
ciphertext when the policies associated with the ciphertext match their key’s attributes.
An index is created over the data files and encrypted using a searchable encryption
scheme. This is a trade-off between functionality and security as such schemes suffer
from leakage of metadata, for example, what files have a certain keyword in common.
The use case assumes multiple users want to share data securely with each other and host
it on the same cloud provider. For a user A to share data with user B, active participation
is required by A in form of generating a token and credentials that can be used to query
data and decrypt the result set, respectively. Special, uncommon cryptosystems have to
be used and pose fixed requirements on the hardware and features of the cloud offering
being used. Furthermore, the authors stress that their concept is an illustration on how
certain cryptographic schemes could be used together and not a finished system.
A proposal by Waizenegger [Wai17] allows secure deletion of data in an OpenStack
object store (“Swift”). Users encrypt their data before uploading to the cloud. There, the
encrypted data is stored alongside with unencrypted metadata. Deletion uses so called
cryptographic erasure, where simply the key for encrypted data is deleted. As decryption
becomes impossible, the data in question can no longer be read, assuming the employed
encryption scheme will not be compromised in the future. Due to data being encrypted
on the client-side, a malicious cloud provider can only read metadata and does not need
to be trusted regarding successful deletion. As a storage service, it can easily be added
to any existing solution in need of a data store with secure deletion.
Another work in the area of secure deletion of data, this time specifically for backups, is
proposed by Rahumed et al. [RCT+11]. The integral feature is support for versioned
incremental backups where one file can be part of multiple versions. When a file is
encrypted with key kfile, this key itself is then encrypted once for each version this file
appears in, creating a key kvi corresponding to the respective version. Deletion removes
version key kvi and a file remains accessible as long as at least one key kvi exists that is
capable of decrypting kfile. This can be considered as a kind of reference counting. As
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this is intended to be a layer on top of an existing storage solution, it can easily be added
wherever a need for a data store with secure deletion for versioned backups arises.
Aggarwal et al. [ABG+05] present a privacy-preserving, distributed database architec-
ture. Encryption is not required and the cloud does not need to be trusted. This is
accomplished by splitting the data and storing it on two or more providers. The data is
split so that one compromised provider is not enough to violate privacy. Queries from
users have to be pre-processed and sub-queries for each of the involved providers have
to be created. Likewise, the result sets have to be post-processed and split data has
to be merged. However, several assumptions are made. For one, untrusted providers
are not allowed to communicate with each other as their collaboration could undo the
data splitting. Moreover, it is assumed an attacker cannot eavesdrop on more than
one communication channel with the providers because no communication security is
employed. Finally, confidentiality is not preserved, only privacy. The assumption is that,
for example, leaking both the name and social security numer of a customer conjoined is
a problem but leaking this information separately, without relationship, does not violate
privacy. As database service, it can easily be used like other services and integrated into
existing systems.
To securely store sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys on multiple servers, Damgård
et al. [DJNP13] propose a scheme that makes use of spreading keys across multiple
servers. The scenario for this proposal is well-defined: multiple servers that perform
long-lived computations for multiple parties and are subjected to cycles of online and
offline (idle) periods. Computations are carried out during online periods and the
involved parties do not wish to share their secrets with each other, only the computed
result. This is called (Secure) Multi-Party Computation (MPC) and useful for tasks
such as electronic elections and electronic auctions. One exemplary instance of a MPC
problem is the so called Millionaires’ problem, where two millionaires want to figure
out who of them is richer, while hiding their wealth from each other. Appropriate
protocols for MPC exist and can be employed during online periods of the servers.
The main contribution here seeks to protect data during offline periods in such setups.
During these, data is encrypted to protect confidentiality at-rest and the encryption
keys are distributed among other involved servers, so that a minimal number of servers
has to be compromised before the key can be restored. It is assumed that servers
act fully autonomous over a long time. In case this is not applicable and servers are
not autonomous, the security guarantees are weaker. While this effectively solves
the general problem of storing cryptographic keys alongside the data they encrypt, it
requires multiple long-lived servers to be used conjointly and a workload that fits a
cyclic online/offline pattern.
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Access Management
Yan, Rong, and Zhao [YRZ09] present an approach to identity management using
hierarchical identity-based cryptography in a multi-cloud environment. Identity-based
cryptography is a public key cryptosystem where a publicly known string value is used
to generate a public key for a user, for example, the user’s email address. This is done
using a master public key and a corresponding secret key is generated using a master
secret key by a trusted third party. Aside from this trusted third party acting as secret
key generator, there are sub key generators per cloud, thus, making it hierarchical. This
simplifies key management in scenarios where multiple companies use diverse multi-
cloud environments together. Because everybody has access to everybody’s public keys,
all users can mutually authenticate each other. However, identity-based cryptography
has shortcomings regarding key revocation. In order to revoke a user’s key, the master
public key has to be changed. This requires a regeneration of all valid public keys.
Alternatively, the revoked user’s identity has to be chanced, which can be rather difficult
in practice, when email addresses or phone numbers are used. Moreover, a key escrow
situation exists. As the third party holds all users’ private keys, it has to perform all tasks
— such as signing — that involve a secret key on behalf of the respective user. Lastly, the
third party must be absolutely trusted.
Because key management systems are all about not storing keys where they are used,
Lei, Zishan, and Jindi [LZJ10] propose a key management infrastructure consisting of a
dedicated client and server. The server is composed of a symmetric key management
system and a PKI as backend. Client and server communicate using an own protocol.
The major difference to open standards, such as the Key Management Interoperability
Protocol (KMIP)1 by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information
Standards (OASIS), is supposed to be interoperability between clouds as different clouds
can communicate and exchange information about keys. However, for this to work,
cloud providers would be required to integrate this protocol and support this proposed
infrastructure at a large scale.
Liang et al. [LAL+14] propose a modified version of proxy re-encryption (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2.1) called DFA-Based Functional Proxy Re-Encryption, allowing for better access
management. Pieces of additional data are appended to encrypted files and Determinis-
tic Finite Automata (DFA) are attached to cryptographic keys. Decryption is only possible
when this additional piece of data is accepted by a key’s DFA. A semi-trusted proxy
performing re-encryption can alter the attached piece of data along the transformation
of the ciphertext. In settings where Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is considered for access
management, this adds more freedom to express complex policies. Compared to CP-ABE
1Communication protocol for manipulating cryptographic keys [Org17b]
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PRE, which adds a set of attributes to private keys and access policies to ciphertexts, this
approach is secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs).
A system by Tang et al. [TLLP12] allows access management for storage services. It
is designed to be an overlay over an untrusted provider and works on top of a cloud
storage solution. Data is encrypted with a symmetric cipher. The respective keys are
encrypted using an asymmetric cipher with keys containing an access policy. These keys
are managed by a quorum of key managers that operate using threshold secret sharing
and, therefore, are considered trusted. Furthermore, CP-ABE is used for communication
between client and key manager to enforce fine-grained access policies. The system
supports timed expiration and assured deletion by revoking file access. Potential use
cases include backups and file-sharing using untrusted storage providers. A prototype
running on Amazon S3 was tested and showed a factor of increased estimated storage
and transfer costs of less than two, for a series of PUT and GET requests.
Another solution for fine-grained access management is proposed by Wang, Liu, and
Wu [WLW10]. They propose hierarchical attribute-based encryption, a combination of
hierarchical identity-based cryptography and CP-ABE. In such a setup, revocation is
difficult because whenever a user associated with an attribute a is revoked, all keys with
the same attribute a have to be updated. In order to postpone these updates, make
updating of keys lazy, PRE is employed. A version number is used for each attribute
used in CP-ABE and increased when an associated user is revoked. When other users
later request access to a file associated with a, the version of their attributes is checked.
In case an older version is found, the users are told to upgrade their keys and the system
will re-encrypt the requested data so it can be accessed using the updated keys. This is
supposed to help enterprises share parts of confidential data.
Chow et al. [CCH+12] present a dynamic system that preserves confidentiality of data
in the cloud with access management for users. It is dynamic with regard to new users
as they can join the system at any given time and are still able to decrypt the encrypted
data. This is accomplished by a modified broadcast encryption scheme. Broadcast
encryption allows a ciphertext to be encrypted once and decrypted by a group of users.
As the name suggests, broadcast encryption originates from broadcasting channels and
is also employed for the Content Scramble System (CSS) used for DVD encryption
and the Advanced Access Content System (AACS) used for Blu-ray disc encryption.
There are various different approaches to this problem, all with the requirement of
having a dynamic set of users, changing on every transmission. Additionally, simple
revocation of users must be possible without affecting other users. Access management
is accomplished by assigning data files to classes and specifying who can access which
classes. The system is CCA secure and does not incur notable storage overhead. Through
the usage of group signature schemes, users can act anonymously while accountability
is still maintained because their identity can be revealed. The system’s use case and
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dynamic user management is specifically tailored to data sharing among a large group
of users that is constantly changing.
Architecture
In order to tackle this diverse set of threats and vulnerabilities that arise from the
architectural circumstances of cloud computing, Almorsy, Grundy, and Müller [AGM16]
suggest an equally diverse set of solutions and mitigation strategies. Among others, se-
cure VM repositories, improved VM isolation and secure virtual networks are mentioned.
Secure APIs with proper isolation, open standards in authentication and authorization
as well as protection from attacks targeting specific parts of the Service-Oriented Archi-
tecture (SOA) — such as XML-related attacks, DoS, MITM — are described. Web-facing
components have to be scanned for known vulnerabilities and protocols, such as SOAP
have to be secured, so they will not leak data or allow other tampering by unauthorized
users. Finally, intelligent key management and proper identification are required so that
encryption can successfully protect confidentiality of data. Jansen [Jan11] additionally
recommends conventional client-side and server-side protection, using techniques such
as operating system hardening, in order to prevent a malicious client from compromising
a server or service.
Furthermore, Dawoud, Takouna, and Meinel [DTM10] consider physical vulnerabili-
ties, such as malicious employees. Locked high security rooms with physical access
management and monitoring prevent adversaries from damaging hardware, in order to
deny services to a customer, theft as well as corruption of data due to direct physical
access. However, such security measurements are problematic, as a customer has to take
a provider’s word for it and cannot verify if such mechanisms are really enforced.
Wang et al. [WRLL10] explain the importance of audits for the security of cloud storage.
Detecting data corruptions as late as when data is accessed is undesirable and potentially
too late for graceful recovery. Further, they advise that audits, where data has to be
downloaded in order to be verified, are impractical. Therefore, Wang et al. [WCW+13]
propose a protocol to make public auditing on secure storage possible, while maintaining
privacy. Public auditing refers to the ability of an external party, for example, a contracted
company, to audit cloud storage without the need for downloading the content in order
to verify it. Therefore, confidentiality and privacy is protected. Before a client uploads
data to the cloud, it is necessary to compute a Message Authentication Code (MAC) for
at least a subset of files and send these codes to the auditor. A MAC allows to verify
the integrity of the file as well as the authenticity of its creator. For the same purpose,
a Homomorphic Linear Authenticator (HLA) can be used. It allows to be aggregated
and computed over a linear sequence of data blocks of arbitrary length. To perform an
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audit, the auditor asks the cloud provider to compute such MACs for files stored online
and compares them to their local copy they previously received from the client. The
protocol emphasizes efficiency for the third party auditor and allows batch processing of
multiple clients. Non-invasive auditing of such form can be added on top of an existing
system. The use case considers situations of data storage, where other means of integrity
verification or encryption are considered overkill, too expensive or key management too
complicated.
With their system SecCloud, Wei et al. [WZC+10] consider more than only secure storage.
Additionally, they consider a malicious cloud provider that might either manipulate
computations or only pretend to have performed them. The system at its base uses
audits, essentially sampling in intervals. Data integrity is verified using data signing and
auditing of computational results is accomplished by verifying a probabilistic subset of
all computations. This requires a trusted third party as auditor which is expected to have
significant computational resources. The cloud needs to implement the devised protocol
to communicate with this trusted auditor. As an auditing scheme, it can be added on top
of an existing system that uses secure storage and computations and wishes to increase
security. However, probabilistic auditing alone does not make computations fully secure,
it only increases the chances to detect potential fraud.
Vieira et al. [VSWW10] propose an intrusion detection system for environments with
many compute nodes. On each node, extensive logging of events is performed and
analyzed. Based on logs, they try to identify and trace back potential attacks to the
responsible user. User behavior is analyzed in order to preemptively find suspects. The
system mostly acts reactive to situations that have already happened, preventive and
protective actions are limited to malicious behavior that is correctly anticipated. Such a
monitoring system could be combined with existing processing systems, given that their
middleware can be deployed and is able to access the necessary information.
As a holistic solution for security in the cloud, Santos, Gummadi, and Rodrigues [SGR09]
present their Trusted Cloud Computing Platform (TCCP) because customers using a
cloud offering, even in case of IaaS solutions, cannot protect themselves against a
malicious provider or insiders with elevated access. Therefore, this proposal suggests
a closed box execution environment that cannot be tampered with, even by the cloud
provider’s system administrators. This is accomplished by running a so called Trusted
Virtual Machine Monitor (TVMM) on every node. It manages and hosts the VMs of
customers as well as restricts access even for privileged administrators. Further, it
maintains and protects its own integrity. Similar systems protect single VMs and are,
therefore, unable to ensure security beyond it. For this reason, a so called Trusted
Coordinator is employed. It manages a set of TVMM-running nodes per customer,
essentially establishing a confined, secure and trusted space. Coordinator and TVMM
collaborate to protect VM images even during migration and prevent them being started
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on untrusted hardware. To make all of this possible, a special hardware chip is required
and used to install the TVMM in a secure boot process on the respective node. A client
is able to verify remotely if an implementation of TCCP is running. All in all, a cloud
provider needs to implement the necessary software as well as hardware to run this
system and then expose it to its customers.
Virtualization
As Garfinkel and Rosenblum [GR05] see the problems of virtualization in the flexibility
and heterogeneity of VMs, their evident solution to security problems is to strip them of
this versatility and impose severe limits on functionality. This is accomplished by using
a virtualization layer that will take over security and management functions, usually
found within the guest operating system of a VM. Furthermore, policies enforce limits
on VMs and can grant exceptions for certain users. This proposal is only a concept and
would need to be implemented by a trusted cloud provider.
With their Advanced Cloud Protection System, Lombardi and Pietro [LP11] propose an
approach that extends protection of VMs to the other cloud infrastructure components
involved. The system is based on extensions for the Kernel-based Virtual Machine
(KVM), which is based on the Linux kernel and essentially turns it into a VMM. Instead
of performing emulation itself, it rather exposes an interface for a host to be used. To
achieve its goal, the proposed system transparently monitors key components of the
cloud architecture and potential targets of an attack. Active as well as passive monitoring
is used to guarantee integrity of both, middleware and kernel. Entry points into the
system are monitored by logging and periodic verification of used binaries and libraries.
The protection provided by this system covers attacks from other VMs as well as attacks
from outside the cloud. It prevents attacks on VMs that might result in the leakage of
data, improves data segregation between customers, and is fully implemented. However,
to use it, a cloud provider has to deploy and support it. It also assumes the cloud
provider is a fully trusted entity and considers a VM image to have integrity up until it is
exposed to the network.
ZeroVM from Rad et al. [RLP+14] is a different approach to virtualization in the cloud.
Typically, data is either uploaded by a user or moved from a data store to a VM in
order to process it by an application. With ZeroVM, the application is moved to the
data store to process the data directly where it is located. It is designed as middleware
package for an OpenStack object store (Swift) and executes ZeroVM Application Packages.
Security is gained by processing data right where it is stored and, therefore, reducing
data movement. Other than that, it claims deterministic processing execution, increased
isolation and provides a lightweight container-based virtualization platform. It has to be
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implemented by a cloud provider that needs to be trusted. Additionally, data processing
software needs to be written for, or ported to the Google Native Client (NaCL) platform
in order to use it as ZeroVM Application Package. However, other than rewritten or
ported software, it also requires redesigned processing patterns and workflows to be
compatible with this different approach to data processing in the cloud.
Instead of changing current paradigms of data processing in the cloud, Szefer et al.
[SKLR11] left VMs where they are. However, identifying the VMM as a major source
of vulnerabilities, they conclude to remove it in a system called NoHype. VMs now
natively run in parallel on the underlying hardware. An interruption in a VM that gives
control back to the VMM, could get exploited by the guest but is now no longer possible.
Modifications to the operating system are required for this system to work, making it
rather invasive. Moreover, so called hypercalls, required by paravirtualization to request
privileged operations, are not supported. Completely removing a system containing
vulnerabilities is a reliable way to eliminate them, however, new ones will be inevitably
introduced along the way. NoHype does not secure VM related mechanisms, such as
migration or snapshots and it can only be implemented by the provider of a cloud, whom
we have to trust.
Wu et al. [WDWY10] present a framework for virtual networks. In virtual networks,
multiple clients share the same network hardware. This makes various attacks possible
that result in data leakage, such as sniffing or spoofing attacks. Not just privacy is
endangered, as careful monitoring can leave an adversary with the SSH password of
its victim through keystroke timing attacks. The proposed framework consists of three
layers (routing, firewall, shared network) and provides stronger isolation. As with every
other solution around the topic of virtualization, the cloud provider needs to implement
these approaches and systems.
Distributed Processing
Data can be reliably protecting while in-transit and at-rest using cryptosystems and
message authentication. However, to process data it usually has to be decrypted,
exposing a weak point attackers can target. Proper access management can help to
restrict the audience of sensitive computations as well as the corresponding results
but does not keep data strictly confidential while in-use. Homomorphic encryption
(cf. Section 2.2.2) is one kind of encryption that allows to perform computations on
encrypted data, omitting this weak point. Due to the high complexity and computational
resources needed, Naehrig, Lauter, and Vaikuntanathan [NLV11] attested it a limited use
for general purpose systems. They present specialized use cases, where the application
of a partially homomorphic cryptosystem is viable, such as contextual advertisement
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that involves private information about the targeted users. Nevertheless, homomorphic
encryption does not solve all problems, as it does not automatically guarantee that the
computations performed are the computations desired. Due to it being malleable, an
adversary can still attack computations using homomorphic functions and manipulate
results by, for example, subtracting values that should not have been.
Bacon et al. [BEP+14] evaluate possibilities to apply Information Flow Control (IFC) to
the cloud to achieve secure computing. In this data-centric approach, access policies are
attached to data in form of security labels and define which user has what kind of access.
A special runtime environment tracks all data in the system and limits data propagation
by enforcing these access policies. Alternatively, a static analysis of programs can be
conducted to ensure their data usage complies with the policies. Depending on the
choice of labeling mechanism and scheme, complex access hierarchies can be modeled.
This is not only confined to the user-space inside a VM but can include the VMM and
surrounding environment as well, depending on what level the IFC is implemented.
Therefore, it also provides isolation in multi-tenant environments, where multiple clients
with different access privileges share a single environment, as they are often used in
SaaS offerings. It also allows to secure data processing without the need for encryption,
when the system can ensure that no data is leaked to unauthorized users. A provider
can expose this functionality and clients can attach security labels to their own data
prior to upload. However, there is no way for a client to ensure that access policies
are correctly enforced. In case of IaaS offerings, clients can use their own IFC-enabled
operating system but are still subject to vulnerabilities of components this operating
system runs on top of. Additionally, the tracking of data often assumes a benevolent
developer who does not deliberately try to negatively influence tracking. Moreover, it
is not guaranteed that all data flows are tracked and some data flows, such as covert
channels, are inherently not tracked.
To abstract multiple clouds, Bessani et al. [BCQ+13] propose a system called DepSky.
It exposes a secure, distributed data storage featuring various improvements due to it
building a cloud-of-clouds. Increased availability is achieved by replication across multiple
clouds as well as the usage of erasure codes. Additionally, this enables corruption
protection and prevention of vendor lock-in. Encryption is used to address confidentiality
and keys are managed with a secret sharing scheme, therefore, spitting keys across
clouds, with a quorum required to access a key. However, the system only considers
storage and does not consider processing or any kind of code execution in its security
concept. The features depend on the usage of multiple clouds and the redundancy,
which will inevitably increase costs and might therefore not be desirable. Moreover, the
secret sharing scheme used is incompatible with most other access or key management
approaches.
35
3 Cloud Security: State of the Art
Apache Hadoop is a mature framework for distributed processing and storage. Nonethe-
less, it lacks various security related functionality. This situation improved with authen-
tication using Kerberos, extensions for access tokens and delegation of privileges as
proposed by Das et al. [DORZ11].
In recent versions, Hadoop offers optional encryption using special directories within
the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) [Apa17]. This encryption is end-to-end
between clients and transparent, meaning that no explicit encrypt or decrypt action has
to be issued by a client, similar to Full Disk Encryption (FDE). This implies that data
in-use is not encrypted. It provides security for data at-rest and in-transit within the
HDFS. Data is organized in encryption zones. Multiple zones can exist and each one
is associated with its own unique encryption key. Files within an encryption zone are
encrypted using per-file keys. These keys are encrypted using the closest zone’s key and
stored in encrypted form alongside the file they belong to. Access control for encrypted
files is managed using regular HDFS file system permissions. However, an attacker
taking over a privileged account can only access encrypted data and the corresponding
encrypted keys. Decryption keys are managed by a separate entity, a key management
server, which is additionally enforcing an own set of permissions.
In cases where stronger encryption is preferred, Yang, Lin, and Liu [YLL13] propose a
triple encryption scheme for HDFS. Files are encrypted using a symmetric cryptosystem
and the respective key is encrypted with an asymmetrical cryptosystem, using keys of
the respective owner of the file. This is called a hybrid encryption scheme. A data
management system associates files with users to keep track of the required keys. This
hybrid encryption scheme is extended by another layer, utilizing the International Data
Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) to encrypt a user’s asymmetrical keys. That makes it
possible to store them on the server as well, sparing the user from key management tasks
and lowering the risk of keys being stolen from insecure users. Aside from encrypting
data at-rest, processing of data is not considered. Access management is based on users
and, therefore, does not trivially support file sharing with others. Multiple users with
access to the same file implies them to either share their keys — and with that share
all data encrypted with these keys — or have multiple versions of the same file, each
encrypted with different keys. The former makes key management complex, in case of
many users sharing files with different audiences.
Lin et al. [LSTL12] propose one more hybrid encryption scheme for HDFS. Files are
encrypted with a symmetric scheme and random session keys. These keys are encrypted
using an asymmetric scheme and keypairs per owner of a file. One noteworthy detail
about their implementation of symmetric file encryption is the combination of block
cipher and stream cipher for the last part of a file, to avoid wasting space due to padding.
Compared to Tahoe-LAFS — a secure and encrypted distributed file system that can
be used by HDFS clients with an adapter — this proposal uses fewer keys (per user),
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resulting in easier key management. Tahoe-LAFS uses a key per file, resulting in a more
complex key management but also allows better fine-grained permissions. This proposal
stores a file’s symmetric key as its header, resulting in a linear storage overhead on the
servers and a constant overhead for users in form of their asymmetric key. Tahoe-LAFS
does not exhibit a storage overhead on the servers, instead users have to store these keys
themselves. The implementation was tested and is within 50–75% read performance of
unmodified HDFS, with Tahoe-LAFS being slower. For writing performance it behaves
vice versa.
G-Hadoop, an extension to Hadoop making MapReduce tasks across multiple clusters
possible, is further extended with a security model by Zhao et al. [ZWT+14]. G-
Hadoop replaces HDFS with Gfarm, an open source, petascale grid file system. The
designed security model consists of multiple components, such as Single Sign-On (SSO)
for authentication, asymmetric encryption for communication, access control, and
protection in form of detection of malicious users. Access control is fine-grained with
respect to the involved components, so that individual users can have no access to
certain slave nodes. This is possible because access privileges of users are stored in the
user database for every single node. The security model ensures privacy so that slave
nodes do not see user information. To send jobs, users authenticate to the master node
using SSO. Subsequently, a temporary user instance will be created and used to process
the job. Proxy credentials with limited lifetime are created for this temporary user in
order to authenticate itself with slave nodes. The framework reliably prevents a series of
common threats, such as MITM and replay attacks. Proven technologies, such as Secure
Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS), Secure Shell (SSH), and SSO are
used in order to achieve security and no special cryptosystems are required. Internally, a
Certificate Authority (CA) is used, adding to the rather complex setup. As with the other
systems and frameworks for Hadoop, data processing is not strongly protected by means
of encryption. However, in this case, at least access to nodes is limited to privileged
users.
Hamlen et al. [HKKT10] conclude that a holistic solution to secure the cloud is too
complex. Consequently, they propose a series of enhancements to Hadoop that, in
total, are supposed to lead to a secure cloud. They also consider a setup composed of
multiple clouds. Key features include secure and encrypted data storage, large scale
query processing, fine-grained access control and strong authentication. As data format,
only XML with RDF data is considered and used with an access control scheme that
allows access to only a subset of a single document by utilizing view modification. Secure
publication of data is done by splitting files and publishing them on untrusted third
parties. Access policies are sent alongside the respective files and enforced by the third
party. Because the party is untrusted, measures have to be taken in order to verify the
authenticity and completeness of the files. This is accomplished by encrypting various
compositions of files with the respective owner’s key. To achieve encrypted storage, that
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integrates the published data, secure co-processors are used to handle encryption and
decryption tasks. Secure co-processors are dedicated, verifiable and tamper-resistant
hardware. Furthermore, VM and VMM are assumed to exist in a secure version alongside
a secure virtual network monitor. They are used to provide isolation between users
and data domains. For access management, they propose a privileged process that
is capable of rewriting binaries of other programs. This privileged process will inline
checks to enforce fine-grained eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
access policies into untrusted programs on the fly. This approach allows to perform
history-based access policies that can be used to enforce fairness. With regard to secure
query processing, solutions are investigated to enforce access policies during processing,
for example, by inserting WHERE conditions into a query. The proposal covers many
aspects of cloud computing. Secure co-processors help with reliable cryptography on
untrusted providers and can store the most important keys. However, the assumptions
and preconditions make deployment on a suitable cloud provider difficult, especially the
secure co-processors and various secure versions of common software. The amount of
access required to implement a process privileged enough to rewrite arbitrary binaries
rules out SaaS and PaaS offerings and likely exceeds IaaS offerings as well. Therefore,
to implement such an approach, cooperation with a cloud provider is inevitable.
Regarding the need to trust cloud providers, the question arises why tamper-resistant
secure co-processors are not used to perform all relevant computations. Secure co-
processors are very specialized, limited-purpose hardware. They are not equipped with
vast computational resources and only simple software so that it can be completely
verified [HKKT10]. Trusted Computing attempts to combine general purpose hardware
with trusted software. This is accomplished based on a secure cryptoprocessor, such
as the Trusted Platform Module [Tru17]. Combined with compatible software, a chain
of trust can be established. Open source software does exist to construct such a chain,
starting with a boot loader (TrustedGRUB), an operating system (Trusted Linux) and a
VMM (Trusted Xen). Different possibilities exist to implement a Trusted Platform Module.
While discrete chips provide a certain tamper resistance, implementations integrated
within other chips or such that run in software are not required to be tamper-resistant.
Consequently, achieved security and trust of the established chain can vary and might not
be comparable to a secure co-processor. However, Trusted Computing is controversial
because it delegates a high amount of control of hardware and software to third parties.
Various critics exist, such as Richard Stallman [Sta17] (Free Software Foundation) and
the Electronic Frontier Foundation [Ele17]. They oppose the amount of control it gives
to big companies, allowing them to restrict software used by clients.
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The objective is a generic concept that can be applied to many distributed data processing
applications, in order to provide information security and protection from adversaries.
It is intended to be used by users who wish to protect their cloud-based distributed
processing, without forgoing the benefit of a vast market of cloud services, as it is
available today. The result is a concept that protects its user actively by employing
customized, protective actions. Additionally, recommendations are made that can
increase security passively.
Following, the term component is used as an abstraction of a data source or dedicated
processing step, be it a simple storage service or a distributed Hadoop program.
In this chapter, requirements are defined along with a threat model that has to be
considered. Then, the proposed security concept is presented.
4.1 Requirements
The following requirements were derived from intensive literature research and con-
sidered relevant to a holistic security concept that is designed for customers of cloud
solutions.
Req1 Access control for users Users who commission processing of data should only
be able to use sets of data and data processing routines they have necessary access
privileges for.
Req2 Access control for processing components All components handling data, such
as servers or services in the cloud, should be subject to access control. Components
should only be able to process data they are authorized to process.
Req3 Confidentiality Eavesdropping or data leakage should not disclose plaintext data
to adversaries. Confidentiality should be ensured for data in-transit and at-rest for
every component involved that supports arbitrary but secure kinds of encryption.
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Req4 Integrity Data should be protected against modification by adversaries in-transit
and at-rest, for every involved component and user supporting appropriate tech-
nologies and algorithms.
Req5 Identification All users and components involved in planning and data processing
should be uniquely identified.
Req6 Heterogeneous environment Secure data processing should be possible with
cloud solutions that are available today. Environments composed of many diverse
configurations and capabilities should be supported and not restricted to a specific
cloud computing service model.
Req7 Adjustable security requirements As strong security and high performance are
often diametrical requirements, it should be possible to influence the security
concept regarding the algorithms it employs.
Req8 Flexibility The security concept should not rely on a specific algorithm but rather
be compatible with a wide range of possible technologies and algorithms. It should
be able to incorporate future findings of cryptographic research.
Req9 Privacy It should be possible to ensure special privacy requirements when needed,
for example, when processing medical data with sensitive information.
Req10 Scalability and distributed processing A security concept should not limit scala-
bility or distributed execution of data processing.
Ensuring availability, together with confidentiality and integrity often called the CIA
triad of security [Win11], is considered a service provider’s responsibility and part of the
guarantees they make to their customers.
4.2 Thread Model
The threats and vulnerabilities a cloud user is exposed to are described in Section 3.1.
It is also necessary to know who threatens a cloud customer’s security. The only trusted
party is the user applying this security concept, along with components, in complete
control of this user. The provider of a cloud service is not a trusted party, unless there are
technologies available that allow users to monitor and verify the integrity of a provider
and its services. Therefore, potential adversaries include untrusted providers, other
customers of the same cloud service provider, and yet unknown parties alike.
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4.3 Concept Overview
The approach of this security concept is guided by the strategy of Hamlen et al. [HKKT10]
— chaining together a series of technologies — and utilizes key technologies loosely
based on the ones identified by Zissis and Lekkas [ZL12]. A generic security concept for
distributed data processing is a difficult task, mainly due to the high number of involved
components, where each potentially carries a multitude of attack vectors. Besides, the
degree of control over these components varies and is not uniform. Combining current
cloud offerings for data processing results in a highly heterogeneous environment, with
each component supporting a different set of features and levels of control. Additionally,
security of distributed data processing systems in cloud environments does not start at
the servers a cloud consists of. Rather than that, a flow of data has to be considered in
its entirety. Starting with a user sending — or a source providing — data to the cloud,
to a consumer receiving computations made online, all are part of the whole process
and all of these involved parties have to be covered by a security concept.
In order to create a general concept that can cope with multiple use cases and constantly
changing infrastructure, it is composed of two parts: a modeling phase where the
processing steps are modeled as well as analyzed, and an execution phase where the
actual processing takes place.
During modeling phase, it is algorithmically decided for a given data flow what measures
to take in order to secure the upcoming data processing. This includes cryptographic
ciphers, algorithms, protocols, solutions to access management, and additional or
modified processing steps, if needed. User input can be used to further refine the
parameters determined in this phase. This approach allows to find an optimal set of
security measures for each distributed processing task, tailored to the individual user-
needs, components and cloud services involved.
After modeling, in the execution phase, an arbitrary execution engine then orchestrates
the specific data flow and takes measures to ensure security as previously determined.
4.4 Building Blocks
Two essential parts are involved in securing a data flow: the modeled data flow plan
and a security provider, handling authentication, authorization and key management.
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1
2
3
CPU	# 1
CPU	Ext AES,	FPU
MEM 64KB
CPU	# 4
CPU	Ext SSE4
MEM 4GB
CPU	# 2
CPU	Ext FPU
MEM 1GB
Cipher AES
Serialization CSV
Protocol SOAP
Cipher BBS (PRE)
Serialization -
Protocol Hessian
Cipher BBS (PRE)
Serialization XML
Protocol SOAP
…
Figure 4.1: Annotated graph with components 1, 2 and 3. Component capabilities in
blue and determined security parameters in orange tables.
4.4.1 Plan
A plan is an artifact of the modeling phase. It is based on a given directed acyclic graph
that models the data flow of a user’s distributed data process. Nodes represent compo-
nents, therefore, processing steps, data sources and sinks. Directed edges mark the flow
of data in form of transmissions. This graph is now attributed with information to secure
the data flow, such as used protocols, additional processing steps, signature schemes
and cryptographic ciphers to be applied along with parameters, such as encryption key
length. These parameters are determined algorithmically for each data flow, based on
the capabilities of available cloud environments and services involved.
Figure 4.1 illustrates a simplified example of an annotated graph. Hardware capabilities
are listed in blue tables alongside their corresponding node. These values are used
to determine the security parameters, represented as orange tables. Algorithmically
determined parameter values are attached to nodes and can be logically divided into
three distinct sets. Values relevant for:
1. incoming data transmissions: how is an incoming stream of data protected and
formatted
2. outgoing data transmissions: how is an outgoing transmission of data protected
and formatted
3. handling data: how to protect data on the current node, mainly data at-rest
This dynamic determination allows us to generate security parameters adapted specif-
ically to each individual data flow’s combination of cloud environments and services.
It is important to notice that this approach is not limited to one specific cipher or
cryptographic algorithm. Even major distinctions, such as asymmetric or symmetric
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n n+1
Cipher AES,	Serpent
n v n+1
Cipher Serpent
Cipher Serpent
Cipher AES
Cipher AES
Figure 4.2: Component v is inserted to enable a secure data transmission from n to n+1.
encryption schemes, are not predetermined and can be selected based on the given
situation. Choices, such as cryptographic algorithms, data exchange formats or com-
munication protocols do not necessarily have to be identical for the whole data flow.
Instead, these parameters can change between each component or user.
The resulting security parameters can also be optimized for different goals. For exam-
ple, one can optimize for maximum security by selecting strong, cascade encryption
approaches. In other cases, a small computational overhead can be accomplished by
using only simpler, hardware accelerated ciphers, or even relying on a simple SSL/TLS
connection because the target SaaS offering does not support anything else. Such modi-
fications can be implemented by modifying the function MostSecure in Algorithm 4.1 to
select, for example, the fastest instead of the most secure security parameters.
However, the input graph is not only annotated but also modified when deemed neces-
sary. In case two connected components have an empty disjunction of parameters, when
there is no cipher or protocol supported by both, additional processing steps can be
inserted into the flow as an adapter to create compatibility. As illustrated in Figure 4.2,
this is done by splitting the original edge and connecting both components with an
additional component, creating compatibility and preventing an insecure connection.
Such an adapter component can also be used to increase transmission security in cases,
where two components have a broad range of supported security features but only share
weak ones.
An implementation is depicted in Algorithm 4.1. For every edge (n1, n2) of a given
directed acyclic graph G = (V,E), it first determines the security parameters supported
by the connected nodes n1 and n2, based on their capabilities. If the intersection of
both nodes’ security parameters is not empty, the most secure one is selected. For empty
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intersections, a new node v is created that shares a nonempty intersection of supported
security parameters with nodes n1 and n2. The original edge (n1, n2) is removed from
E and edges (n1, v) and (v, n2) are added, connecting the newly created node. The
algorithm then processes the newly added edges. After all edges are processed, the
optimal supported security parameters are determined for every node.
Algorithm 4.1 Determine security parameters for a given directed acyclic graph. Opti-
mizing for maximum security.
function ANNOTATEGRAPH(G = (V,E))
TransmissionSecParams← ∅, StorageSecParams← ∅
for all (n1, n2) ∈ E do
sp1← VIABLESECPARAMS(CAPABILITIES(n1))
sp2← VIABLESECPARAMS(CAPABILITIES(n2))
i← sp1 ∩ sp2 // the security parameters n1 and n2 have in common
if i ̸= ∅ then
i← MOSTSECURE(i)
TransmissionSecParams← TransmissionSecParams ∪ {(n1, n2, i)}
else
v ← NEWCOMPONENTWITH(MOSTSECURE(sp1), MOSTSECURE(sp2))
E ← {(n1, v), (v, n2)} ∪ E \ (n1, n2)
V ← V ∪ {v}
(_, TSP ′, _)← ANNOTATEGRAPH((∅, {(n1, v), (v, n2)}))
TransmissionSecParams← TransmissionSecParams ∪ TSP ′
end if
end for
for all n ∈ V do
sp← MOSTSECURE(VIABLESECPARAMS(CAPABILITIES(n)))
StorageSecParams← StorageSecParams ∪ {(n, sp)}
end for
return (G, TransmissionSecParams, StorageSecParams)
end function
Further modifications to the graph can be made to extend access management. Addi-
tional processing steps can be added in case specific obligations were imposed by the
authorization control. Obligations can mandate certain parts of the data to be modified,
which can be useful in various situations. For example, a user is working with a medical
data set but should not be able to see names of patients. A processing step can be added
to anonymize these at an appropriate time in the data flow, before the user will see any
data.
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Based on the finalized graph and the order of processing steps, necessary artifacts
are generated that are needed during execution. These include unique authentication
credentials for every component and user involved but can also include cryptographic
keys to allow for secure communication with the security provider.
The attributed graph and generated artifacts together form the plan, which is digitally
signed to prevent unauthorized modifications. The finished plan is sent to the execution
engine in charge of orchestrating the data process and a copy is sent to the security
provider to handle authentication and authorization requests during execution.
4.4.2 Security Provider
The security provider is a special component forming an integral part of this security
concept. It is an instance controlled by the user interested in secure data processing,
therefore, considered trusted and used for authentication, authorization, and key man-
agement. Despite its numerous tasks, it is specifically designed to have an overall low
workload and scales linearly with the number of components and transmissions involved.
Note that a component abstracts a whole processing step in its entirety, so there are no
scaling issues with a highly distributed processing step, as it is considered as one single
component.
The security provider maintains a registry of every known user and their respective
access privileges, defined in advance. Access privileges for components and users to
parts of data during execution follow implicitly from the plan the security provider
received. Each component and user is only aware of their direct adjacent neighbors
in the graph. Moreover, they are only entitled to receive data transmissions from such
nodes they receive a positive inflow from (that is, have an incoming edge). The plan
is also used by the security provider to extract authentication credentials and other
artifacts that were generated for the components. Further artifacts, such as encryption
keys, are then generated for every data transmission, based on the security parameters
found in the plan.
During execution, users and components will authenticate with the security provider
and receive the necessary artifacts to decrypt incoming data, encrypt outgoing data and
handle their stored data, operating based on the plan. This serves as access control
per user and component, as they only receive keys and data necessary for their step in
the chain of data processing. As the plan is digitally signed, the security provider can
validate it if needed because it knows all users.
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4.5 Applying the Concept
Following is described how this concept is applied to secure distributed data processing
in two phases.
Phase 1: Modeling
During the modeling phase, a graph suitable for generating a plan (as described in
Section 4.4.1) needs to be created. To yield such an input graph, a user can utilize
an unspecified tool to either create the whole data process from scratch, or model an
input graph for an already defined data process. Such a modeling tool can utilize the
security provider for access control and restrict the data sources or data processing steps
a specific user is able to use. This input is then transformed into a plan as described
above, signed by the modeler and handed over to an execution engine for processing. It
is also sent to the security provider. The procedure can be seen in Figure 5.2b.
Note that neither the input graph, defining the data flow with its components, nor
the finalized plan, have a fixed format. Both are merely a collection of information
and their realization is left to concrete implementations for generating such a plan.
One possibility is to utilize already existing formats, such as input formats used by
workflow and execution engines. Workflow or execution engines typically operate
based on a file format that models processes and their relationships. This model
references implementations in a repository of the engine. The engine executes the
defined model by running appropriate implementations and routing data flows between
defined components, as specified by the given model. Consequently, the output format of
a plan, as defined above, can target such an execution engine and realize the determined
security parameters by using suitable implementations in the engine’s repository. This
allows secure distributed data processing with standard execution tools that need not be
customized.
Phase 2: Execution
The data flow, as defined in the previous phase, is then processed.This phase is imple-
mentation specific, therefore, the following will focus on certain generic key elements.
For ease of discussion, it is assumed that processing is done by an executing engine as
mentioned in the previous phase.
In order to explain the events taking place during execution, we assume a generalized
and simplified abstraction of a data flow. Every executed data flow can be broken down
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(a) Insecure execu-
tion
encrypt
decrypt
encrypt
decrypt
Source
Presentation
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Processing
Storage
request
key	retrieval
(b) Secure execution
Figure 4.3: Insecure (left) and secured (right) data processing side by side. Every
component authenticates and, when authentication succeeds, receives infor-
mation and cryptographic keys.
into a set of abstract flows consisting of four components: data source, presentation
of a result, and data processing as well as storage. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.3,
in which a classic execution (left) and a secured execution (right) can be seen, fol-
lowing a previously generated plan. It can be seen that all transmissions of data are
now encrypted (green). Furthermore, data is decrypted (red) and newly encrypted
(green) for each transmission. Appropriately chosen protocols ensure data integrity
and authentication of parties involved in the transmission. Data is stored encrypted
on dedicated storage services and is also encrypted in temporary storage on processing
services. Unless cryptosystems with homomorphic properties or similar algorithms are
used (cf. Section 2.2.2), data has to be in plaintext during processing.
At time of provisioning, each component, such as cloud services or other processing
facilities, receives its individual, unique authentication information that was created
as part of the generated plan. With that, each component can authenticate with the
security provider, who is also aware of these credentials because it received a copy of
the plan. Before a component attempts to receive data, it contacts the security provider
and authenticates. Upon success, the security provider will supply the component with
necessary information and credentials to receive and decrypt an incoming data transfer.
Because the security provider is aware of the plan and each component is using unique
authentication credentials, the legibility of the component’s request can be reliably
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➂ request	encryption	information
Figure 4.4: Requests made by component n to the security provider.
n-1
n
n+1
Figure 4.5: n+1 is unable to intercept data from n-1 because it does not posses necessary
decryption information.
determined. Further requests are made to the security provider for credentials to protect
temporary or permanently stored data. Before data is sent to the next component, one
more set of information and credentials is requested, so that the current component
knows how to communicate with the target and how to protect the data during transfer.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
This makes it impossible for a component to properly receive data transfers intended for
other components and implicitly enforces the correct order of the data flow. It is also
not possible for a component to produce data transfers that can be used by components
other than the ones intended to. This is illustrated in Figure 4.5. Note how component
n− 1 can send valid data to n and n to n+ 1. However, n+ 1 is unable to intercept data
from n+ 1. Both components are not aware of each other, the protocol to be used was
never specified for this pair of components and, therefore, would have to be guessed. In
case certain restrictions can be made to the determination of security parameters, such
as using asymmetric cryptosystems, reverse data transfers from n+ 1 to n and n to n− 1
can also be reliably prevented.
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Distributed Processing
A component is an abstraction of a processing step and as such it can also represent
a distributed processing step, for example, an instance of Hadoop. Even though it
consists of potentially many compute nodes internally, such a case does not need special
handling. Receiving and transmitting protected data from and to other components
works as described above. For component-internal security, it is assumed the used
distributed processing framework is equipped with appropriate functionality to protect
data at-rest in-between processing steps. This is the case for Hadoop: authentication is
supported using Kerberos [DORZ11], encryption for data at-rest is available in HDFS
[Apa17] and extended versions with stronger security guarantees and access control are
available as well, for example, G-Hadoop [ZWT+14].
Reducing Flexibility
Even though this security concept focuses on flexibility regarding the applied security
parameters, it is worth mentioning that optionally limiting the cryptographic ciphers to
proxy re-encryption schemes (cf. Section 2.2.1) has advantages.
The major advantage is the prevention of one plaintext step. Considering a component
n with encrypted data in either temporary or permanent storage: this data needs to
be decrypted and then encrypted again for the next component n+ 1, before it can be
transmitted. Between decryption and encryption, the data is in an unencrypted state
for a short time, potentially only in memory. In case a proxy re-encryption scheme is
used, the component would request a re-encryption key RKn→n+1 from the security
provider, instead of a decryption and new encryption key. By using re-encryption instead
of decryption and encryption, the data will never be unencrypted between storage and
transfer to the next component n+1. Additionally, depending on the actual cryptosystem
being used, re-encrypting is usually a less computationally expensive operation.
4.6 Recommendations
As a user of cloud services, one is subject to the features and capabilities offered by the
provider. This is especially true for SaaS offerings but also for IaaS, where customers
are often limited to configurations with respect to their VMs, while the surrounding
architecture is out of control. This is necessary, of course, to provide proper user isolation
but it also limits customers in what they can do. It also creates uncertainties regarding
the promises made by a provider. Even though the presented security concept is designed
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to be used with arbitrary cloud services, given the choice, a customer should select
offerings that help to increase security overall and reduce risks.
Open standards in authentication and authorization, such as the OASIS’s Security Asser-
tion Markup Language (SAML)1 and XACML2, are more likely to be widely supported
and receive good implementations, compared to self-made solutions. As mentioned
in Section 3.2, web-facing technologies have to be properly hardened [Jan11] and
secured by the provider [AGM16]. This also implies classic security technologies, such
as web-application scanners, penetration testing and firewalls.
Because virtualization security is usually completely out of control for customers, it
is even more important to pay attention to the virtualization technology a provider
uses. Solutions to secure these parts are presented in Section 3.2 and customers can
prefer cloud providers implementing such systems. Additionally, the Cloud Security
Alliance [Clo17] published recommendations regarding virtualization security that can
help customers assessing the risks they are exposed to with a certain provider.
One more important aspect is audit and monitoring. Users should be aware of the
auditing capabilities a provider makes available to its customers, regarding their data
and the services they use. Several possibilities to use such capabilities, in order to
increase security, are described in Section 3.2.
1XML-based format for exchanging authentication information [Org17c]
2Language, architecture and processing model for fine-grained access management [Org17a]
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The presented security concept is designed to be generic and applicable to many dis-
tributed data processing systems. FlexMash, as a tool for data mashups (cf. Section 2.1),
is no exception. This chapter describes how the security concept can be implemented in
FlexMash, down to a technical level. Extending plan generation is described, along with
an exemplary setup for a security provider (cf. Section 4.4.2). Finally, it is explained
how FlexMash operates with the security concept.
5.1 Overview
Figure 5.1 shows FlexMash’s steps. User interaction takes place during steps one and
two. Consequently, these steps require a form of access management. Steps three and
four are algorithmic decisions and processing of the mashup plan itself. Actual data
processing — that needs to be protected — happens in the course of steps five and six.
5.2 Plan
Because FlexMash already contains a modeling and transformation step, it can be
extended to also determine the security parameters and artifacts needed for the security
Requirement-attached
Mashup Plan
Requirement 
Definition
Data 
Mashup
Execution
Data Mashup
Modeling
1 2
Executable 
Mashup Plan
Runtime 
Environment 
Selection
Mashup 
Result
Processing
3
Runtime
5 6
Mashup Plan
Transformation
4
Figure 5.1: The six steps of a mashup in FlexMash, from modeling to result processing.
Illustration by Hirmer and Behringer [HB17].
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concept (cf. Section 4.4.1). After a user modeled a mashup, non-functional requirements
are selected. Security can be added as one such requirement. When a user selects it, the
security concept is applied to the modeled mashup. Combining various requirements
such as security and prioritized execution speed can influence the selection of determined
security parameters, for example, by preferring hardware accelerated cryptosystems.
As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, this can be accomplished by different weighting of
parameters in the function MostSecure of Algorithm 4.1.
The presented Algorithm 4.1 is added to FlexMash’s transformation step, in order to
modify the modeled workflow where needed and add appropriate security information
to the executable plan. At this point, the non-functional requirement selection already
took place and it is known if the mashup has to be secured. For the algorithm to
work, capabilities of servers need to be supplied as input. This can be accomplished
by maintaining a list or database with the capabilities of all cloud providers available
to this user. Alternatively, OASIS Topology and Orchestration Specification for Cloud
Applications (TOSCA) can be utilized. Its usage is proposed by Hirmer and Behringer
[HB17] to automatically deploy cloud components on-demand, as needed by a mashup.
TOSCA supports modeling cloud components with ServerProperties and, therefore,
already has the necessary information at its disposal, rendering an external list of
capabilities redundant [Org17d]. In FlexMash’s mashup plan transformation step,
secure DSD and DPD implementations are selected that support the determined security
parameters, such as encryption algorithms, digital signature schemes, and protocols.
The plan’s transformation to an executable format can target, among others, WS-BPEL
or BPMN, as mentioned in Section 2.1. Generated security artifacts can be added as
variable or payload for the respective process. This allows to supply a process with the
necessary credentials needed to authenticate with the security provider during execution,
or cryptographic keys to communicate securely with it. For example, a unique RSA key
pair can be created for each process and the respective process is supplied the private
key for authentication, secure communication with the security provider, and digitally
signing data transfers.
5.3 Security Provider
The security provider is a lightweight server that provides authentication, authorization
and key management services. Along the recommendations made in Section 4.6, solu-
tions based on open standards have considerable advantages and are, therefore, used
for this suggested implementation.
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For authentication, OASIS SAML [Org17c] is used as an open standard for exchanging
authentication information. This defined data format is based on XML and is supported
by a broad range of available software and services, including cloud providers, such as
Amazon [Ama17]. SAML defines assertions, protocols, bindings and profiles. Assertions
are used for authentication statements. They provide information about the authentica-
tion status and can communicate additional attributes about a user. Assertions can also
be used to communicate authorization statements. However, these are not comparable
to the expressive power of XACML. For more complex authorization scenarios, SAML
explicitly supports interoperability with XACML. Protocols define how SAML entities
have to handle SAML elements, such as that a query requires a corresponding response.
Bindings specify the communication protocol used to send a SAML message, such as
SOAP. Profiles are a set of predefined assertions, protocols, and bindings.
While SAML is mostly known for SSO, this is not the only mode of operation it supports.
The generic design of SAML knows three parties: a user, a service provider and an
identity provider where both — service provider and identity provider — have to support
SAML. Upon requesting a resource from a service provider, the user will be redirected to
an identity provider for authentication. The result of this authentication is then passed
back to the service provider. In light of this security concept, the security provider is
both service provider and identity provider, while components are users. The resources
provided to the components consist of the necessary means and information to access
and protect data.
OASIS XACML [Org17a] handles authorization for users that were authenticated by
SAML. Upon authorization requests, the request is evaluated against pre-configured
access policies. The reached decision is then returned.
The internal architecture of XACML separates these tasks among five so called points. A
request is sent to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), converted to an internal format
and sent to the Policy Decision Point (PDP) for evaluation. The PDP evaluates against
access policies retrieved from the Policy Retrieval Point (PRP) and Policy Information
Point (PIP), managed by the Policy Administration Point (PAP). The evaluated result is
returned to the PEP.
XACML supports obligations. These are instructions that need to be followed in order
for access to be granted. For example, a user can get access to sensitive data but only
when logging is turned on and it can be tracked what this user is reading. The paradigm
of access control supported by XACML is attribute-based access control. It works by
associating users and resources with attributes and allows to express complex access
policies.
OASIS KMIP [Org17b] is used for key management. Certificates, cryptographic keys,
and custom data are stored on the security provider as managed objects and — given a
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successful authentication and authorization — communicated to the requesting com-
ponent or user. KMIP supports a wide range of operations, such as creation, retrieval,
registration, replacement, certification, decryption, encryption, export, and import of its
managed objects. Keys can be wrapped in order to transmit them encrypted.
5.4 Applying the Concept
Following, FlexMash operating with the applied security concept is described, broken
down into the two phases of the concept.
Phase 1: Modeling
The modeling step of FlexMash is extended by adding an authentication to the used
modeling tool. The security provider has records for all users and their access privileges
with regard to DSDs and DPDs. Furthermore, the DSDs and DPDs themselves are stored
by the security provider. Upon successful authentication, the modeling tool is supplied
with the definitions of DSDs and DPDs this user is allowed to use. After modeling is
completed, non-functional requirements are selected. For the sake of this description, it
is assumed that a secure execution is requested.
The modeled mashup plan is now transformed into an executable plan according to
descriptions in Section 5.2. After this plan is generated, it is digitally signed by the
modeling user and passed to the selected engine for execution. Additionally, a copy is
transferred to the security provider. Figure 5.2 illustrates this process. The insecure plan
modeling (left) is extended by an authentication procedure (right). Before execution
takes place, the engine can verify the integrity and consistency of the plan with the
security provider, if supported.
As soon as the security provider receives the plan, it starts analyzing it: an identity
is created for each component so they can authenticate with the security provider.
Previously generated artifacts, such as authentication credentials, are extracted from the
plan and further artifacts, such as encryption keys, are generated for each component.
In addition to that, the security provider can validate the consistency of the plan and
make sure that all components used are within the access privileges of the modeling
user. If this is not the case, the security provider can refuse to validate the plan for the
execution engine. It can also refuse to provide requested information and artifacts to
the components, effectively preventing execution.
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Figure 5.2: Prior plan generation (left) and new plan generation (right) in FlexMash
adopting the security concept.
It is important to highlight that until now, no data was processed or transferred. The
modeled mashup plan contains only DSDs and DPDs that are covered by the modeler’s
access privileges. Consequently, the execution is ensured to comply with access policies
as it cannot contain any DSDs and DPDs other than the ones the respective modeler
can access. This provides access management, enforced on the modeling level. The
advantage of this approach is that data does not need to be protected with complex
techniques in order to make selective access from different users possible. Rather, a
user with insufficient access privileges is unable to model a mashup with this data,
unable to commence its usage in the first place. More fine-grained permissions can
be accomplished by providing multiple DSDs that are different views of the same data
source.
Even more flexibility for access control can be achieved by utilizing subflows, a feature
Hirmer and Behringer [HB17] added to FlexMash. It allows to use abstract nodes that
represent a whole mashup plan. When combining this feature with XACML’s obligations,
the security provider can return a node that imposes restrictions on the usage of the
requested resource. For example, when requesting a data source with sensitive medical
data, the security provider can allow a user to use this source but only when various
data fields were anonymized. For this purpose, a subflow node is returned that contains
the requested data source, along with a DPD, to filter sensitive information before the
data can be used for anything else. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
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n-1 n n+1
data	source filter	data
Figure 5.3: Node n-1 is a subflow and consists of multiple nodes internally, in order to
realize an imposed obligation.
Phase 2: Execution
In the final phase, the previously selected engine executes the generated plan. Following
the provided plan, components are provisioned as needed and supplied with authentica-
tion credentials contained in the plan. The components contact the security provider,
authenticate and request artifacts and information about how to handle incoming data,
outgoing data and data at-rest, as illustrated in Figure 4.3. This implicitly enforces that
a component can only access data it is intended to process, based on the execution order
of the plan.
Due to the approach of this security concept, standard formats can still be used for
the executable mashup plan. The only requirement is for the data format to support
input variables for processes in some way. This is not unreasonable, considering formats
like WS-BPEL are expressive on purpose. As a result, workflow engines supporting the
selected executable format can be used without modifications.
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Based on literature research, requirements were defined in Section 4.1. In order to
evaluate the proposed security concept, the fulfillment of these requirements is examined.
Because certain aspects are implementation specific, the evaluation is based on the
suggested implementation in FlexMash (cf. Chapter 5).
Req1 Access control for users
The security provider, as a central trusted entity, manages available components that are
used for modeling a data flow, as explained in Section 5.4. Only authenticated users can
access components and the security provider will only grant requests for known parties
with sufficient access privileges.
Modeling a data flow is done using a tool that communicates with the security provider
and runs within the trusted area of a user. Consequently, when the security provider
receives the digitally signed plan with security information, it can be assumed to be
genuine. However, even a forged plan from a malicious modeling tool cannot lead to
violations of security. The security provider has all data needed to validate the plan
and make sure the modeling user’s access privileges are not exceeded throughout the
data flow. In case such a violation is found, the security provider can either inform
the execution engine by not validating the plan, or refuse responses to requests from
components during execution, withholding information needed to handle data and,
therefore, effectively preventing execution of the data flow.
Req2 Access control for processing components
A given component is either a data source, a data sink (consumer), or processes data.
These components are short-lived in that they are provisioned on-demand and carry out
their processing for one single user, the modeler of a data flow. They are not long-lived
environments with multiple users that share data among each other. Consequently, as
only one user exists and each component only fulfills one purpose, access management
within a component is not necessary.
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This leaves data transmissions for consideration. It has to be ensured that each compo-
nent can only access incoming data it is entitled to. Data sources do not have incoming
transmissions and only operate based on data they already know. Data sinks and process-
ing components, however, do receive data and it must be ensured they only receive such
data they are entitled to handle. As per the defined security plan (cf. Section 4.4.1), all
incoming data transmissions are encrypted. The security provider also makes sure that
each transmission is encrypted with a unique set of cryptographic keys (cf. Section 4.4.2).
For a data sink or processing component to be able to decrypt an incoming data transmis-
sion, the security provider has to be contacted, as it is the only entity with the necessary
information. However, the security provider only supplies a component with information
and cryptographic keys, when the component can successfully authenticate and the
data transmission in question is consistent with the modeled data flow. Consequently, a
component that can either not authenticate successfully or is not supposed to receive this
data transmission, is not supplied with the information necessary to handle an incoming
data transfer.
Req3 Confidentiality
The confidentiality of data can be evaluated in three states: in-transit, at-rest and in-use.
The proposed security concept protects the confidentiality of each state in the same way:
by specifying the security measures that have to be taken.
Due to all transmissions being cryptographically secured, confidentiality is maintained
in-transit. Transmissions between components are encrypted as defined by the plan and
cryptographic artifacts retrieved from the security provider are encrypted as well, so
they cannot be intercepted and stolen. Protection for data at-rest, such as encryption, is
specified in the plan as well. Because resting data is encrypted, snapshots and backups of
data, unwittingly performed by a cloud provider, are of no concern. Once cryptographic
keys are destroyed after data was processed, leftover data in the cloud can be considered
inaccessible, given the used cryptographic cipher is strong enough.
Theoretically, confidentiality for data in-use can be provided as well. However, at the
time of writing, cryptosystems providing necessary features, such as homomorphic
properties (cf. Section 2.2.2), are not yet suitable for data processing. Once they
are, data in-use can be protected by the existing mechanisms of this security concept,
analogous to data in-use and at-rest.
The assumption of encryption being carried out is reliable because the implementations
of components are code supplied by the user or — in the case of FlexMash — provided
by a trusted technical expert. Consequently, collusion between deployed components
can be ruled out as well.
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Analogous to the use of encryption to ensure confidentiality for data in all considered
states (in-transit, at-rest), digital signatures are used to ensure integrity of data. Each
component and user has a unique identity, tied to one data flow, that can be used to
sign transmitted and stored data. This allows to reliably detect modifications from
adversaries.
Req5 Identification
The generation of the plan ensures that for every component and user taking part in
the data flow, unique authentication credentials are produced. This makes it possible to
uniquely identify them even among components part of past and future data flows.
Req6 Heterogeneous environment
The proposed security concept does not require specific features or capabilities from a
cloud service other than means of secure communication. This is trivial for IaaS solutions
as implementations can be provided by the customer. In case of PaaS, the possibilities are
more constrained. However, this is not an issue as the security concept does not require
one specific security feature but rather works with what is available. The situation is
more complex with SaaS solutions. Although even in this case, basic means of secure
communication, such as SSL/TLS, are usually available. The algorithmic generation of a
secure plan, connecting different cloud solutions based on their provided capabilities,
makes sure to allow secure interoperability of heterogeneous cloud solutions.
Req7 Adjustable security requirements
The employed means of security depend on the selection of security parameters that
are available to a component. In the provided implementation for graph annotation
(cf. Algorithm 4.1), this selection is performed by the function MostSecure, which
optimizes for security. Swapping this function with an alternative can optimize for
different goals.
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Req8 Flexibility
The proposed security concept operates independent of specific cryptosystems or algo-
rithms. Determining the security parameters during plan generation works by choosing
an optimal algorithm from an arbitrary set of available algorithms, with the definition of
optimal being up to the user.
Req9 Privacy
In case sensitive data is involved and privacy has to be ensured, the security provider
can issue obligations along permissions for a certain resource. These obligations will
modify data to ensure the desired level of privacy. As obligations consist of components
themselves, they are able to perform arbitrarily complex data operations.
Req10 Scalability and distributed processing
The bottleneck of this concept is the introduced entity called security provider. It is a
required part for the security of this concept. Event though it is theoretically feasible to
work without a dedicated security provider by directly supplying each component with
all necessary artifacts upon provisioning, this inevitably decreases security.
The tasks performed by the security provider are not exceedingly computationally
expensive, with the possible exception of artifact and key generation after a plan was
submitted to it. However, this only happens once for each plan. During execution, the
workload is reduced to authentication and communication duties. This communication is
limited by the number of components and data transfers involved and, therefore, scales
linearly with the size of a data flow. Note that for sequential parts in a data flow, the
security provider does not have to serve concurrent requests. Moreover, components are
an abstraction of their underlying processing entity and a highly distributed processing
step is only considered as one single component. Overall, the expected workload on
the security provider can be considered minimal and does not impede the scalability of
distributed data processing.
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The cloud is a field incorporating a large and diverse set of technologies. And while this
leads to the many benefits cloud services provide, it also brings together the security
concerns of each of these technologies. For users who want to use the cloud for data
processing and entrust their data to the cloud, this is a major hindrance in adopting
cloud solutions.
To asses this problem, literature research was performed and many threats and vulnera-
bilities could be identified that threaten a customer of cloud services. From data leakage
in VMs to insecure authentication of web services, all parts of a modern cloud archi-
tecture can be attacked. Fortunately, solutions and strategies exist to counter various
problems. However, as plentiful as existing security issues are, as many solutions exist,
usually as countermeasure against only a small set of threats. Only few holistic solutions
to security in the cloud exist, often imposing various limitations that restrict their field
of application.
This work proposes a security concept that can be employed by a customer of cloud
solutions. It attempts to provide security for all parts of distributed data processing in
the cloud. To simultaneously support a heterogeneous and large set of existing cloud
solutions, without making many assumptions about the used services, was one of the
objectives. In order to reach this goal, the proposed concept performs a static analysis of
the data flow to be processed and then dynamically determines the best way to secure
this flow. Additionally, recommendations for selection and usage of cloud providers are
given, as some security concerns cannot be addressed by a customer, due to the limited
control over hardware and software. The concept is designed to be generic in order
to allow easy implementation into existing data processing tools. As proof of example,
a possible implementation for the mashup tool FlexMash is provided. The security
concept is evaluated based on requirements that were derived from literature research
on security issues related to cloud technologies. Requirements, such as fine-grained
access management, data confidentiality and integrity, flexibility, and scalability were
found to be met by the proposed concept.
For future work, a way to uniquely identify a VM can increase security. As a VM can be
easily copied by a cloud provider, authenticating credentials contained in this VM are
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copied as well. Such a copy results in a clone indistinguishable from the original. Values,
such as a MAC address, are ineffective for VMs.
As the security concept already performs an analysis in order to determine optimal
security parameters, future work can extend this step to also perform optimizations on
the data flow. This can help mitigate the performance penalty due to encryption. One
more challenge for future work is a way to qualify the security achieved with a specific
combination of used algorithms. This would make optimizing for maximum security
easier and potentially provable.
Furthermore, in regard to the suggested implementation in FlexMash, a visual cue for
the modeler, indicating the security of a mashup, can be a useful extension.
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